Hitler & Economics

[yankees60]

Been reading this excellent book on Hitler as analyzed by a psychiatrist..

Hitler: Diagnosis of a Destructive Prophet

https://www.amazon.com/Hitler-Diagnosis ... l_huc_item


The below is the section on economics under Hitler....interested in knowing if anyone know anything more or has anything to add on the bolded parts...

Vinny

The Economic Miracle

Taking power in the depths of the Great Depression, Hitler knew that the Germans expected him to eliminate unemployment and promptly establish a sound economy. The year 1934, however, was difficult for Hitler and the Nazis. It was referred to as a year of crisis. Norbert Frei spoke of a "hangover" mood among the population.12 Big business and industry were concerned about trade deficit and currency problems, and about possible socialist leanings by the new regime. The middle class felt little had changed. The grand promises had not been fulfilled. Jewish department stores had not been closed. The buying power of the population remained low and prices were high. Peasants, farmers, and large estate owners complained that their plight had worsened. Their income had not risen, and initial attempts by the State to regulate food distribution were clumsy and met with resentment among the agricultural providers. Even the workers, Hitler's favorite social class, though enjoying a decline in unemployment, still waited for higher wages and were forced to accept the loss of collective bargaining and the right to strike.

The politician Hitler knew that rapid changes were essential. Most of all, he wanted to eliminate unemployment, and, indeed, it disappeared in Germany at a time when other industrialized nations, particularly the United States, were suffering heavily from it. Increasing employment was one of Hitler's most remarkable achievements, for which he was given due credit by the population. The economic recovery induced many Germans to believe that Hitler was a man who kept his promises. He increased production to support rearmament and, to a lesser degree, to increase consumer goods. People joked about "cannons and margarine" but found the program acceptable. The hidden cost was that the armament program overheated the German economy, which Hitler later tried to remedy by the takeover of Austria and the Sudetenland, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and, ultimately, the invasion of Russia.

Hitler's economic czar was Hjalmar Schacht, an imaginative financier who became president of the Reichsbank and Minister of Finance. Schacht favored the gold standard, while Hitler rejected it, adhering instead to the concept that the wealth of a nation is its productivity. Schacht devised an ingenious program of deficit financing through the so-called Mefo-dis- counts. These were discounted drafts on a fictitious company-the Metallurgische Forschungsanstalt-underwritten by the largest German steel producers and honored by the government to finance the rearmament pro gram without producing inflation, increased indebtedness, or a negative foreign trade balance. Under Schacht's influence, in the mid-thirties Hitler followed principles similar to views of John Maynard Keynes, the outstanding economist of his time, who proposed deficit financing and public works employment for military and civil projects. The prototype was the Autobahn. Hitler never mentioned Keynes's name, and what Hitler learned about Keynes is unknown. It is likely that Hitler had some knowledge of Keynes, because Keynes was a severe critic of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1934, 4 percent of the gross national product in Germany went to armament; in 1939, this rose to 50 percent. For Hitler, this was not fast enough, and Schacht was demoted to Minister without Portfolio. As Schacht's successor and head of the four-year plan, Hitler appointed Goring, perhaps because he was ignorant of economics but willing to follow the Fuhrer's wishes. In 1944, Schacht was accused of contacts with the Resistance and imprisoned at the concentration camp of Ravensbruck. In his trial at the International Military Court he was acquitted.

Hitler frequently discussed such economic issues as production and consumption, but in essence he viewed them as political, psychological, and social phenomena. He believed in the primacy of politics over economics. Unemployment and inflation, which he dreaded, he considered political problems. By "political" he meant action overcoming fear and greed. He boasted to Schacht, "The primary remedy for the stabilization of our currency is the concentration camp.1113 For Hitler, the discipline of economics had a materialistic, actually a Marxist-Jewish flavor, and thus could not unify the nation, which Hitler considered all-important. His most significant economic-political goal was autarky, and he emphasized this in many speeches and monologues. Hitler wanted to achieve autarky not only by means of technical innovations -such as the production of synthetic rubber and motor fuels-but foremost through the conquest of European Russia, which would provide Germany with both agricultural products and raw materials. Ultimately, autarky was both an economic and a military goal. The Allies' blockade of Germany in the First World War had undermined German material and morale, and Hitler was determined to prevent this from happening again. Psychologically, autarky expressed Hitler's passion for inviolacy.

The question of whether Hitler favored a capitalist or a socialist order has been amply discussed in the literature. Henry A. Turner, Jr., disproved the view that he was a stooge of capitalism.14 According to Rainer Zitel- mann, Hitler had anticapitalist views.15 However, Hitler was inconsistent in his economic and political views. In many statements he called the bourgeoisie weak, selfish, and cowardly, and, in contrast, praised the working class.16 On 19 November 1920, he declared that his Party fought neither right nor left, but took the most valuable from both sides.17 In the early twenties he paid attention to Feder's anticapitalist concept of the "slavery of interest' but later discarded it. In the late twenties Hitler distanced himself from the socialist views of Otto Strasser and Robert Wagener, but after the assump tion of power he supported Ley and his pro-labor sentiments. Yet in his last major speech to industrial, military, and Party leaders on 4 July 1944, he stated, "When this war is concluded with our victory, the private initiative of the German economy will experience its greatest epoch."18 During the war, industrial corporations remained in charge, although their power-like in the Western Allied nations-was curtailed. In a speech to the Gauleiter in February 1945, Hitler complained, "We have liquidated the fighters of the left, but unfortunately forgot to destroy the right. This is our big sin of omission."19 Only a few large state-owned corporations, such as the Goring industries and the Volkswagen Werke, came into being. No expropriations occurred except in the case of Jewish enterprises and the plunder in occupied countries. As Hitler valued both initiative and control, he opted for a mixture of free market and planned economy.

Workers received only slightly higher wages than they had earned in the best years of the Weimar Republic, but considerable social benefits: better pensions, more vacation time, improvement of the work place, better health and recreational facilities. The organization Strength through Joy (Kraft dutch Freude, abbreviated KDF), patterned after the Italian Dopo Lavore organization, contributed much to the leisure activities of the German masses. It was the first organization of mass tourism, taking workers on lowcost vacations from Norway to the Azores. With some pleasure, Hitler participated on one of the steamship trips. Premarital loans, construction of threeto four-room low-rent apartments, and assistance for exceptional needs in winter were additional benefits planned for workers. Of equal importance was a feeling of equality and the opportunity for upward social mobility. A large number of Germans enjoyed the psychic as well as material benefits of these conditions and appreciated Hitler for creating them. While the benefits for farmers were not spectacular, all types of landowners enjoyed being called the guardians of "blood and soil.'

Hitler intended to do more for industrial and agricultural workers, but the preparations for war and the war itself prevented this. He made plans for further social reforms after the victory. Whatever he had in mind, Hitler believed he could control the economy. It was a question of will, not economic laws. According to his dictum, the state was not the servant of capital, but capital the servant of the state. He was convinced that the leadership ultimately decided on production and consumption, and on sacrifices-which, however, always remained modest. If one considers the twin concepts implied in the name of the Party-national and socialist-which Hitler viewed as unique, one must consider the socialist twin as rather atrophic.

[Hal]

You may find this interesting as well...

https://bdmhistory.com

[yankees60]

You may find this interesting as well...

https://bdmhistory.com

Thanks! Looks quite good.

By the way....I'd meant to add that the book on Hitler is an Excellent one. Give it a grade of:

A+++++++++++++